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BOOK REVIEW
LEVIATHAN: THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE
CHALLENGE TO FREEDOM
Kenneth W Starrt
In an age of transparency, let me make clear at the outset of this
review of Clint Bolick's latest book, Leviathan,' that the author and I
have co-labored in the legal vineyards, including most recently in the
closely watched wine litigation.2 The issue that specific case presents
is whether states may, by virtue of the Twenty-first Amendment, dis-
criminate against out-of-state wineries wishing to ship directly to con-
sumers.3 The broader issue, which unifies Clint Bolick's wide-ranging
work, is freedom-freedom of trade in the national economic union.
Prior to that intriguing (and still unfolding) episode, he and I were
(and still are) colleagues over the course of many years in the school
choice battle, culminating in the Supreme Court's milestone decision
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,4 and in Bolick's book, Voucher Wars.5 The
underlying issue, again, is freedom-freedom to choose the right
school for one's children.
t Dean, Pepperdine University School of Law.
1 CLINT BOLICK, LEVIATHAN: THE GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE EROSION
OF LIBERTY (2004).
2 The litigation culminated in Granholm v. Heal., 544 U.S. 125 S. Ct. 1885
(2005), which the Supreme Court decided this term. Granholm is a consolidation of three
conflicting lower court decisions concerning the constitutionality of laws that restrict inter-
state shipment of wine to consumers. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2004)
(upholding the constitutionality of New York's regulatory scheme under the Twenty-first
Amendment), cert. granted in part, 124 S. Ct. 2391 (2004); Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517
(6th Cir. 2003) (holding that Michigan's regulations were discriminatory and violated the
Commerce Clause), cert. granted in part sub nowt., Granholm v. Heald, 541 U.S. 1063 (2004),
and cert. granted in part sub nom., Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Ass'n v. Heald, 541
U.S. 1062 (2004).
3 See Granholm, 544 U.S. at -, 125 S. Ct. at 1895. The case interestingly pits two
parts of the Constitution against each other. See id. The Twenty-first Amendment purports
to grant states broad authority over the sale, importation, and distribution of alcohol
within their borders. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XXI, § 2. On the other hand, the Dormant
Commerce Clause acts as a safeguard against protectionist laws that discriminate against
out-of-state businesses in order to favor local industry. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v.
Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 268 (1984) (quoting Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S.
318, 329 (1977)).
4 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
5 CLINT BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS: WAGING THE LEGAL BATTLE OVER SCHOOL CHOICE
(2003). Again, in the spirit of transparency, in this book, Bolick was kind enough to com-
pliment this reviewer.
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With that brief excursion into full-disclosure land, let me say that
Clint Bolick has stood firmly and consistently on the side of liberty in
the face of governmental intrusions and compulsions. His is a strong
presence in American law and culture, and one need not guess where
he will take his stand. He is grittily determined to enlarge the sphere
of individual freedom and contract the liberty-draining sphere of
compulsion and coercion. He is the champion of the little person
suffering from constraints-and coercive institutions-that stifle op-
portunity and initiative. Bolick, in short, is a committed libertarian.
Not surprisingly, he finds himself in issue-by-issue, ad hoc coalitions-
of which he is a master builder-with individuals and organizations
that might not otherwise find common ground. Not all of Bolick's
allies on school choice will join him, say, in his property-rights initia-
tives, and vice versa.6 The coalitions rise and fall, ebb and flow, but
Bolick's polestar remains the same. Leviathan is a variation on the
Bolickian theme of liberty-the threat to human freedom can come
from close to home, from state and local governments.
I
A foundational principle of the American experiment, one em-
phasized throughout the 1990s in Rehnquist Court jurisprudence, 7 is
that ours is a federal republic." What happens in Albany and Sacra-
mento (or other state capitals) is vitally important to the well-being of
the people in the several states. It counts who is Governor, or Attor-
ney General, and who enjoys control of the state legislature. Who
these people are counts for so much because of the Founders' deter-
mination that the central government would be, as every civics student
knows, one of enumerated powers.9 It will not do for Congress, for
example, simply to take over the education system, or the police func-
6 To give one example, the NAACP filed an amicus brief opposing Bolick on school
vouchers in Zelman, see Brief of the NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. & the NAACP as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
(Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779), but filed a brief supporting Bolick's colleagues, who rep-
resented private property owners in the recent eminent domain case, Kelo v. New London,
843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), affd, No. 04-108, 2005 WL 1469529 (U.S. June 23, 2005), see
Brief of Amici Curiae NAACP et al., Kelo v. New London, No. 04-108 (U.S. granted cert.
Sept. 28, 2004).
7 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (limiting scope of federal
power under Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same); City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (narrowing definition of Fourteenth Amendment
congressional enforcement power over states); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(strengthening states' Tenth Amendment protections against federal intrusion upon their
sovereignty); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (same).
8 See THE FEDERALIS'r No. 51, at 338-41 (James Madison) (Random House 1941).
9 See THE FEDERAUST No. 45, at 303 (James Madison) (Random House 1941) ("The
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and
defined.").
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tion, or the law of domestic relations. Drawing the lines separating
the appropriate exercise of national power from an assault on state
prerogatives is a painstaking, enduring issue in constitutional law. But
what undergirds all this is a sense that securing power close to the
people is presumptively good.
Justice Louis Brandeis famously praised the virtues of decentral-
ized control in his much-cited New State Ice dissent:
There must be power in the States ... to remould, through experi-
mentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet chang-
ing social and economic needs . . . . Denial of the right to
experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to the Na-
tion. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a labora-
tory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to
the rest of the country.10
To justice Brandeis, one of the chief benefits of a federal republic was
state and local governments' ability to respond to specific needs in
innovative ways.11 And, as originally drafted, the Bill of Rights was
consistent with this view. 12 Both the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
set forth explicitly what was already implied in the doctrine of enu-
merated powers: Sovereignty rests with the people, the people dele-
gate specific powers to the federal government, and the remaining
powers default to the states. 13 Under this historic arrangement, the
states were to be the primary guardians of individual liberty. 1 4
At the close of the Civil War, however, it was utterly untenable to
entrust the states with unsupervised responsibility for individual
rights. Slavery had made it appallingly evident that the states must be
held accountable to a federal standard.' 5 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, in combination with the nationalizing events of the twentieth
century (particularly the Great Depression), worked a major shift in
power away from the states and toward the federal government.' 6 At
the same time, Congress exercised its commerce power to foster a na-
tional economic union and protect it against balkanizing tenden-
10 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11 See id.
12 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 34.
13 See U.S. CONST. amends. IX, X; BOLICK, supra note 1, at 34-37.
14 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 34-37.
15 See id. at 37-42.
16 See id. at 41 (noting that new power to "curb state abuses of rights" the Fourteenth
Amendment granted the federal government); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF
RIGHTS: FDR's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 43 (2004)
(discussing the choice in power from the states to the federal government resulting from
the New Deal).
2005] 1641
CORNELL LAW REV1EW
cies. 1 7 These developments severely curtailed the states' ability to
conduct "social experimentation."
There were those who called for even greater centralization.
Most obviously, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, through the New
Deal, sought to provide security to the American people through myr-
iad federal programs. 8 The Works Projects Administration, Social Se-
curity Administration, and the National Labor Relations Board are
only a few familiar examples. 19 Yet Roosevelt envisioned even more
federal hegemony, as explained by Cass R. Sunstein in his recent
book, The Second Bill of Rights.20 Professor Sunstein focuses on
Roosevelt's State of the Union Address in 1944, in which the President
called for further expansion of fundamental economic rights.21 In-
cluded in Roosevelt's vision were rights to meaningful employment,
adequate wages, satisfactory medical care, and a good education. 22
Though Congress never officially adopted these rights, Professor Sun-
stein points out that many Americans still look to the federal govern-
ment for the creation and maintenance of these sorts of centralized
privileges, 23
Yet the ghost of Justice Brandeis still walks. Amid the centraliza-
tion movement are heard countervailing calls for greater respect of
state prerogatives and the inviolability of state structures. More re-
cently, the 1990s witnessed the apparent triumph of structural federal-
ism in an impressive (and deeply controversial) march of Supreme
Court cases. In divided rulings such as United States v. Lopez2 4 and
United States v. Mornson,2 5 the majority forcefully pushed the pendu-
lum back in favor of state power, limiting Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause. This victory for state autonomy, however, has
not gone unchallenged. To the contrary, mighty arguments have
been advanced that the Morrison decision, and others like it (such as
Lopez), are major steps backward for individual liberties. Martin
Garbus, in his book Courting Disaster,26 suggests that it was the states'
failure to protect battered women that prompted the federal legisla-
17 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 55 (discussing the conflict between the Supreme
Court and the Roosevelt Administration over New Deal legislation and the eventual expan-
sion of the Court's interpretation of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause).
18 See id. at 44-53.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 See id. at 9-16.
22 Id. at 13.
2- See, e.g., id. at 62-64.
24 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
25 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
26 MARTIN GARBUS, COURTING DISASTER: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNMAKING OF
A mF.RiGS LAxW (2002).
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tion at issue in Morrison.27 Faced with the manifest, undeniable prob-
lem of violence against women, the Supreme Court nonetheless
refused to uphold the obvious default option: federal enforcement.28
Garbus viewed Morrison as a stirring victory for "states' rights" at the
expense of individual liberty, relegating battered women to seek pro-
tection from the same states that had already failed them.2 9
II
In Leviathan, Bolick approaches the issue of federalism from a
different angle. Not only do state and local governments fail to pro-
tect individual liberties, but often those same governments engage in
active abuse of individual rights.3 0 Pointing out the relative ease with
which small majorities gain control of local government, Bolick ech-
oes James Madison's warning in Federalist 10. Popular government is
too easily guided "not according to the rules of justice and the rights
of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and
overbearing majority." 31 The danger that specialized interests will
work to the abuse of individual liberties is nowhere more apparent,
Bolick posits, than in local government. 32 Few Americans know the
individuals who serve in their local government, how they got there,
or what exactly they do.33
Leviathan is presented in three parts. Bolick begins with a discus-
sion of federalism in general: its design, evolution, and application to
protect individual liberties. 34 From there, Bolick relates a number of
his personal experiences with the Institute for Justice-"-examples of
how he has fought for individual rights against the "grassroots tyr-
anny" of local government. 36 Bolick concludes with a brief discussion
of what can and, in his view, must be done to rein in local govern-
27 Id. at 139-46.
28 See id. at 143-46.
29 See id.
30 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at xiv-xix.
31 THE FEDERaLIST No. 10, at 54 (James Madison) (Random House 1941); see BOLICK,
supra note 1, at xiv-xix (discussing Bolick's concept of "grassroots tyranny").
32 See Boi CK, supra note 1, at xi-xiii.
33 Id.
-14 See id. at 3-65.
35 The Institute forJustice is a libertarian public-interest organization that Bolick co-
founded in 1991. See Inst. forJustice, Staff Biographies: Clint Bolick, at http://www.ij.org/
staff/bolick.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2005). In 2004, Bolick became president and gen-
eral counsel of the Alliance for School Choice, but he has remained affiliated with the
Institute for Justice as counsel for strategic litigation. Id. In that capacity, he argued the
Granholm case before the Supreme Court this term. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. -,
125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005).
36 BOLICK, supra note 1, at 67-154.
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ment.3 7 The courts serve as the Bolickian-preferred avenue of
recourse. 
8
A. Local Government and the Purpose of Federalism
Bolick begins his work with a general description of local govern-
ments nationwide: growing in number, virtually invisible, and inti-
mately involved in our daily lives. 39 State and local governments
spend more money and employ more workers than the federal gov-
ernment.40 Positions on influential local bodies such as school
boards, water districts, and zoning commissions are often filled by ex-
ecutive appointment or low-turnout elections. 4 1 As a result, the enti-
ties responsible for setting property taxes, regulating local business,
and overseeing public education are largely unknown, unaccountable,
and particularly susceptible to control by organized interests.4 2 In Bo-
lick's pessimistic vision, the unobserved, pervasive power of local gov-
ernment poses a significant threat to individual liberty. 43
Having signaled the danger that local governments pose to indi-
vidual freedom, Bolick sets forth a useful reminder of the history and
purpose of federalism. 44 Federalism, he explains, is primarily con-
cerned with individual liberty.45 The federal and state governments are
set against one another, not to protect their own respective powers,
but to defend the rights of individuals.46 When one level of govern-
ment oversteps its bounds, the other acts as a counterbalance. 47 Early
on, federalism expressed a preference for decentralized decisionmak-
ing, as evidenced by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. 48 Under that
early model, as we have seen, the states constituted "natural guardi-
ans" of individual liberty.49 But, as our national experience tragically
demonstrated, this trust proved profoundly ill-founded.50 As a rem-
37 See id. at 157-73.
38 See id. at 159-60.
39 See id. at xi-xiii.
40 See id. at 7, 11.
41 See id, at 17-18 (discussing "special districts," governmental entities designed to
provide specific services such as schooling, electricity, or transportation).
42 See id at 20-22 (discussing the ways in which special districts are prone to being
captured by business interests); see also id. at 148 (noting that urban public school systems
are "especially sensitive to special-interest manipulation").
4_1 See id. at 24 ("The propensity of local governments toward grassroots tyranny has
been recognized since the earliest days of our republic, but never have the implications for
individual liberty been more profound than they are today. Fighting city hall has become a
Daniel versus Goliath struggle.").
44 See id. at 25-65.
45 Id. at 28-30.
46 See id. at 29.
47 See id. at 33-34.
48 See id. at 36.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 36-39.
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edy, the Fourteenth Amendment conferred unprecedented powers
on the federal government to check state violations of individual
liberties.5
Shortly after its adoption, however, the Fourteenth Amendment
wa.; seriously constrained in the Slaughter-House Cases,52 which, in Bo-
lick's words, "gutted" the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 53 Bolick
suggests that had Slaughter-House been decided differently, the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause would have served to protect fundamen-
tal rights, such as economic liberty, that are currently subject to abuse
by state and local governments. 54 As it is, the Supreme Court is still
free to apply the principles of federalism in defense of individual lib-
erties, but does so in what Bolick discerns to be a frustratingly ad hoc
manner.5 5 Bolick expresses concern that liberal and conservative Jus-
tices alike resort to the doctrine when it comports with their personal
preferences. 56 As examples, Bolick cites Romer v. Evan 5 7 and Bush v.
Gore.58 Romer had the liberal members of the Court standing up for
the individual rights of homosexuals against the voting majority, while
the conservative members of the Court objected on federalism
grounds. 59 Yet in Bush, the tables were turned. There, the conserva-
tive members of the Court advocated the rights of individual voters
against the state supreme court, while the more liberal Justices waved
the flag of federalism. 60 On the whole, Bolick argues, this inconsis-
tency undermines the power of federalism and erodes individual
liberty.61
B. The Ground Battle for Individual Liberties
Having described federalism's purpose and design (and how it is
often misapplied), Bolick then relates several stories from his personal
experience. 62 These examples are organized according to the differ-
51 See id. at 39-41.
32 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
53 BOLICK, supra note 1, at 44.
54 Id. at 45-46.
55 See id. at 54-64.
56 See id. Bolick terms the liberal Justices' approach to federalism "situational federal-
ism," claiming "its proponents essentially defer to state prerogatives except when they
don't." Id. at 50. Similarly, Bolick labels the conservative justices' approach " ' theJurspru-
dence of Selective Intent"' because, in Bolick's view, conservatives apply principles of origi-
nal intent only to " ' c onstru[e] government powers and the powers of the majority broadly
and individual rights narrowly."' Id. (quoting STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE
CONSTITUTION 25 (1987)).
57 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
58 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
59 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 61-62.
60 See id. at 62-63.
61 Id. at 64-65.
62 See id. at 69-154.
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ent liberties that Bolick has defended against perceived government
abuse: freedom of commerce, property rights, free speech, and the
like.
Freedom of commerce is one liberty Bolick has seen recurrently
abused by state and local governments. Local governments restrict
entrepreneurship and start-up businesses by means of regulations, li-
censing requirements, and fees. 63 Often the boards and agencies that
control access to a trade are governed by members of the established
business community-who, unsurprisingly, are not eager for new com-
petition.64 As a result, would-be enterprises, such as African hair-
braiding shops, commuter-van services, and local wineries are seri-
ously restricted, sometimes into nonexistence, by protectionist, inflex-
ible municipal governments-governments that easily fall prey to
control by the established cosmetology, transportation, or liquor in-
dustries. 65 To make things worse, Bolick says, the Supreme Court's
"rational basis" test provides precious little relief from grassroots
tyranny.66
Not only do local governments stifle competition and market
choice, but they also violate private property rights as a matter of
course. As Bolick persuasively illustrates, abuse of eminent domain
power is on the rise. 67 Constitutionally, governments can condemn
private land only for public use, but Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff'8 effectively read the "public use" limitation out of the Consti-
tution.69 In that case, the Court held that condemnation proceedings
to combat concentration of land ownership qualified as a "public
use." 70 Now, local governments are quick to condemn privately
owned property any time a so-called "higher use" is available-one
that will result in higher tax revenues to the government.71 Bolick
relates how advocates of private property rights have won scattered
victories against eminent domain abuse in state courts and notes that
incremental progress was made in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Coun-
63 See, e.g., id. at 73-74 (discussing the wide variety of regulations affecting start-up
businesses).
64 See id. at 69-82. As one of several examples, Bolick relates the story of Garland
Allen, an elderly African-American barber from Lebanon, Tennessee. Id. at 69-70. Be-
cause there were no Tennessee barber colleges that admitted African Americans when
Allen was a young man, he learned the trade from his father. See id. at 69. He continued
running his father's shop for decades, until 1996, when the Tennessee Board of Barbering
Examiners had him arrested for "impersonating a professional." Id. Not surprisingly, a
rival barber had turned Allen in for cutting hair without a barbering license. See id. at 70.
65 See id. at 69-80.
66 Id. at 74.
67 See id. at 83-99.
68 467 U.S. 229 (1984)
69 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 88.
70 See Midkiff 467 U.S. at 241-42.
71 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 84.
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cil.72  As he describes it, though, the law remains woefully
underdeveloped. 73
Bolick analyzes how other rights and "fundamental liberties" have
suffered at the hands of overgrown local government. Free speech is
often curtailed at the state and local level, due to the Supreme Court's
distinction between "commercial speech" and "political speech" and
the limited protection the Court affords the former.74 One example
Bolick cites is Kasky v. Nike.75 Under California law, Nike opponents
spoke out publicly against the company's overseas labor practices, all
under the generous protections of "political speech." 76 When Nike
launched its own ad campaign to defend its practices, the California
Supreme Court determined that this was "commercial speech" and
subject to state restrictions on truth in advertising. 77 Caught in a pub-
lic relations battle not of its own making, Nike found its right to en-
gage in political speech seriously limited because of coexisting
commercial ramifications. 78 Presented with the opportunity to extend
greater protection to this "mixed speech," the United States Supreme
Court declined to get involved. 79
Bolick concludes with discussions of privacy rights, racial discrimi-
nation, and the grave issues relating to public schools and school
choice. Privacy, Bolick asserts, is a right that too few are willing to
honor when they find the practice in question to be offensive. 80 Many
who supported the freedom not to associate with homosexuals in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,8i Bolick emphasizes, took issue with the same
liberty when it meant allowing homosexual sodomy in Lawrence v.
Texas.82 And many of those who joined the majority in Lawrence were
opposed to the rights upheld in Dale.8 3 Likewise, Bolick views racial
discrimination as a tool of convenience for local government-and
the courts-citing to the landmark affirmative action decision in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger. 4 Bolick's final illustrations center on the problems
72 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see BOLICK, supra note 1, at 91-92.
73 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 92-99.
74 See id. at 102-10.
75 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099, and cert. dismissed as improvi-
dently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003); see BOLICK, supra note 1, at 107-10.
76 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 107-08.
77 See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 964.
78 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 107-09.
79 See id. at 109; supra note 75.
80 BOLICK, supra note 1, at 115.
81 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
82 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see BOLICK, supra note 1, at 115-23.
83 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 115-24.
84 539 U.S. 306 (2003); see BOLICK, supra note 1, at 135-37. Bolick notes, "Many con-
servatives will decry racial preferences in college admissions while finding racial profiling
entirely permissible; while many liberals see it exactly the reverse. That is one reason why
164720051
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with public schools, particularly in large, poor urban districts.8 5 In
these districts, bloated school administrations are impenetrable and
unresponsive to the concerns of parents, who generally lack the re-
sources to move to the suburbs or place their children in private
school.86 In order to protect the individual liberties of these parents
and their children, Bolick argues, parents need greater school choice
(i.e., voucher programs) and schools need more transparent
control.8 7
C. A Call for Action
The final part of Leviathan is relatively brief. Here, Bolick argues
that to curb local governments' abuse of individual liberty our primary
recourse must be the courts: federal, state, and the informal court of
public opinion. 8  First, Bolick challenges, friends of liberty must fight
in the federal courts to expand protection of individual liberty and
contract the tyrannical power of government.8 9 Bolick cites the cam-
paign to restore economic liberty to the status of a fundamental right
as an example of effective litigation against "grassroots tyranny."90
Slowly, through carefully selected cases involving particularly harsh
abuse of sympathetic plaintiffs, the federal courts can be used to
counteract local restrictions on economic freedom.9 1 Second, Bolick
proposes that sincere advocates of federalism make better use of the
state courts, something the political left has been effectively doing for
years.9 2 Though the federal constitution sets the "floor" for individual
liberties, state constitutions often can be used to create higher "ceil-
ings,"9 3 which may, in turn, influence other states.94 Finally, Bolick
tells of several cases lost in the courthouse, but won in the court of
the promise of equality is eroding: Too few of us honor the principle across the board
.... " Id. at 129.
85 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at 143-48.
86 See id. at 148.
87 See id. at 149-54.
88 See id. at 160-61.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 161.
91 See id. at 163-64. Bolick relates the story of Ego Brown, a bureaucrat-turned-entre-
preneur who worked with members of the homeless community in the District of Colum-
bia to operate a sidewalk shoeshine business. Id. at 162-63. When the District stepped in
to enforce a Jim Crow-era law prohibiting shoeshine stands on public streets, Brown an-
swered with an equal protection challenge. Id. The federal district court struck down the
law-initially designed to keep African Americans from achieving economic indepen-
dence-as a violation of equal protection. Id. This decision, Bolick notes, served as an
important building block in other economic liberty cases. Id. at 163.
92 Id. at 164-69. Bolick cites liberal activists' success in suing for the right to gay
marriage under state constitutions as one example. Id. at 164-65.
93 See id. at 164.
94 See id, at 166.
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public opinion. 95 Media attention and public sentiment, he shows,
can be used to expose restrictive practices to "the light of day, which
exerts the same withering effect on government abuse as sunshine
does on a vampire."9 6
III
Leviathan gives the reader a thought-provoking glimpse of Bo-
lick's rich experience on the front lines of litigation on behalf of the
Institute for Justice. His stories of victory against abusive local govern-
ment are powerful, yet Bolick himself acknowledges that these illustra-
tions are not necessarily representative. 97 For most Americans, the
adage "you can't fight city hall" still holds true.98 In that sense, Bo-
lick's book serves as a call to arms, demonstrating that you can fight
city hall-if you have the right tools. In Bolick's vision, the intelligent
and persistent use of the courts to fight "grassroots tyranny" will, given
time, restore fundamental individual liberties such as economic free-
dom, school choice, and rights to privacy.99
In emphasizing the importance of the courts, however, Bolick
chooses not to discuss other, more democratic, avenues of relief.
Conspicuously absent from his call to action against "grassroots tyr-
anny" is any "grassroots" response (other than getting the media in-
volved in a public relations war). Apparently, the solution to the low
voter turnout and constituent ignorance described in Chapter One is
not to get out the vote or learn who sits on the school board, but to
ask the courts to intervene. While Bolick provides various examples of
local governments insulated from local accountability, this is certainly
not the case with many of the governments described in Chapter One.
Another possibility Bolick chooses not to address is federal legis-
lation. At its best, Congress is the people's body and has tools for
controlling local government that goes astray.10 0 A much-debated ex-
ample is the No Child Left Behind Act, 10 1 in which Congress itself
pressured local school boards to be more accountable to the children
95 Id. at 169-73.
96 Id. at 173.
97 See id. at 172.
98 Id. at xiii-xiv (noting the challenges individuals face when litigating against local
government).
99 See id. at 157-73.
100 Though, at times, Congress's reach may exceed its grasp, as demonstrated by its
recent involvement in the Terri Schiavo matter. Congress passed legislation allowing Schi-
avo's parents to bring their case in federal court, but could not ultimately compel the
federal court to overturn an earlier state court ruling. See Abby Goodnough, U.S. Judge
Hears Tense Testimony in Schiavo's Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at Al. As explained be-
low, Congress has had greater success influencing the political branches of local govern-
ments by means of its Spending Power.
101 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-7941 (Supp. II 2002).
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and parents they serve.' 0 2 Another example is the 1984 Equal Access
Act,10 3 upheld by the Supreme Court in the Mergens'0 4 case. There,
Congress required all federally funded schools to provide equal access
to facilities for both religious and secular extracurricular student orga-
nizations.10 5 This change was effected not only under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also under the authority of the Spending Clause. 10 6
"He who pays the piper calls the tune," as it were, and Congress's con-
trol of the purse allows it tremendous influence over public schools
and other levels of state and local government.
On the whole, however, Bolick offers an important insight into
the centrality of the courts in the protection of individual liberties. As
Archibald Cox wrote in The Court and the Constitution, "Today the ma-
jor function of the Court... centers on the protection of individual
rights against governmental aggression." 1 7 Writing in 1987, Professor
Cox pointed out that modern trends were certain to raise additional
conflicts between the individual and organized society: "right to die"
arguments, forced medication of "dangerous" offenders, and the
then-unrealized spread of terrorism into the United States.1 8 As state
and federal governments attempt to manage these knotty issues, the
courts will continue to serve as the natural arbiter between the two
levels of government.
Having made (and thoroughly illustrated) his point about the im-
portance of the courts to the protection of individual liberty, Bolick's
Leviathan does leave even the sympathetic reader with a vague sense of
disconnection. Many of the "evils" of local government described in
the opening chapter never play out in the remainder of the text.
Water districts, zoning commissions, and tax assessors are initially de-
scribed as affecting our lives in "intimate" ways, 10 9 but these particular
bogies fail to enter an appearance in Part Two. Likewise, the prover-
bial and omnipresent local school board appears from the first page
of the book as an ominous, unknown entity, doing who-knows-what
with and to your children. Yet, when Bolick comes to discuss public
education in Chapter Nine, he ultimately admits that most rural and
suburban school districts really are not that bad; it's only the large,
urban districts that are particularly unaccountable to parents."10
102 See id. § 6301.
103 Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000).
104 Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990).
105 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (a).
106 See id. § 4071.
107 ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 347 (1987).
108 Id. at 347-48.
109 See BOLICK, supra note 1, at xii.
1o See id. at 147-49.
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Whatever its flaws, however, Leviathan stands as an important ex-
pression of the Bolickian commitment to a culture of liberty and as an
enthusiastic libertarian embrace of a robust judicial power.
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